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Abstract: 
Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should 
be run in the interests of shareholders. This is a suitable objective function 
when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this 
is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. Corporate 
governance issues are especially important in emerging countries, since 
these countries do not have the long-established financial institution 
infrastructure to deal with corporate  governance issues. This paper 
discusses how emerging countries are dealing with corporate governance 
issues and the extra obstacles they have to overcome due to a lack of 
regulations. Romanian case study is examined. 
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Introduction 
The compatibility of corporate 
governance practices with global 
standards has also become an 
important part of corporate success. 
The practice of good corporate 
governance has therefore become a 
necessary prerequisite for any 
corporation to manage effectively in the 
globalized market. 
The term “corporate governance” 
is a relatively new one both in the public 
and academic debates, although the 
issues it addresses have been around 
for much longer, at least since Berle 
and Means (1932) and the even earlier 
Smith (1776). In the last two decades, 
however, corporate governance issues 
have become important not only in the 
academic literature, but also in public 
policy debates. During this period, 
corporate governance has been 
identified with takeovers, financial 
restructuring, and institutional investors' 
activism. One can talk about the 
governance of a transaction, of a club, 
and, in general, of any economic 
organization. In a narrow sense, 
corporate governance is simply the 
governance of a particular 
organizational form - a corporation. 
Viewing the corporation as a nexus 
of explicit and implicit contracts, Garvey 
and Swan assert that governance 
determines how the firm’s top decision 
makers actually administer such 
contracts (Garvey and Swan, 1994).  
Shleifer and Vishny define 
corporate governance by stating that it 
deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
A similar concept is suggested by 
Caramanolis-Cötelli, who regards 
corporate governance as being 
determined by the equity allocation 
among insiders and outside investors 
(Caramanolis-Cötelli, 1995). 
John and Senbet propose the 
more comprehensive definition that 
corporate governance deals with 
mechanisms by which stakeholders of a 
corporation exercise control over 
corporate insiders and management 
such that their interests are protected 
(John and Senbet, 1998). They include 
as stakeholders not just shareholders, but also debt holders and even non-
financial stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, customers, and 
other interested parties. Hart closely 
shares this view as he suggests that 
corporate governance issues arise in an 
organization whenever two conditions 
are present (Hart, 1995). First, there is 
an agency problem, or conflict of 
interest, involving members of the 
organization – these might be owners, 
managers, workers or consumers. 
Second, transaction costs are such that 
this agency problem cannot be dealt 
with through a contract. 
Zingales defines corporate 
governance as the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex-post 
bargaining over the quasi-rents 
generated by a firm (Zingales, 1997). 
He considers that all the governance 
mechanisms discussed in the literature 
can be reinterpreted in light of this 
definition.  
An OECD study considers that 
corporate governance is the system by 
which business corporations are 
directed and controlled (1999). The 
corporate governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spells out the 
rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives 
are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring 
performance. 
Roe define corporate governance 
as the relationships at the top of the firm 
- the board of directors, the senior 
managers, and the stockholders (2004). 
In his opinion institutions of corporate 
governance are those repeated 
mechanisms that allocate authority 
among the three and that affect, 
modulate and control the decisions 
made at the top of the firm. 
Core corporate governance 
institutions respond to two distinct 
problems, one of vertical governance 
(between distant shareholders and 
managers) and another of horizontal 
governance (between a close, 
controlling shareholder and distant 
shareholders). 
A few studies have examined 
corporate governance in emerging 
markets. Researchers (Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang, 1999; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; 
Lins, 2000) have studied the 
implications of the concentrated 
corporate ownership that is common in 
many emerging and developed markets 
and conclude that the principal agency 
problem in large corporations around 
the world is that of restricting 
expropriation of minority shareholders 
by the controlling shareholders. 
 
Key actors of corporate 
governance 
Good corporate governance 
requires a clear understanding of the 
respective roles of the board and of 
senior management and their 
relationships with stockholders and 
stakeholders. The relationships of the 
board and management with 
stockholders should be characterized by 
transparence; their relationships with 
employees should be characterized by 
correctness; their relationships with the 
communities in which they operate 
should be characterized by social 
responsibilities; and their relationships 
with government should be 
characterized by a conformation with 
international and internal laws. 
The key actors of corporate 
governance are board of directors and 
senior management led by the Chief 
Executive Officer. 
 
Board of directors 
Corporation is managed under the 
direction of the corporation's board. The 
board makes the selection, 
compensation and evaluation of a well 
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directors, CEO manages the everyday 
affairs of the corporation. The board of 
directors acts for the corporation's 
stockholders. 
Also responsibilities of 
corporation's board must include (The 
Business Roundtable, 2002, pp. 4-6): 
•  Planning for management 
succession 
• Understanding, reviewing and 
monitoring implementation of the 
corporation's strategies  
• Understanding and reviewing 
annual operating plans and budgets 
•  Focusing on the integrity and 
clarity of the corporation's financial 
statements and financial reporting 
• Advising  management  on 
significant issues facing the corporation 
•  reviewing and ratifying systems 
of risk management and internal control, 
codes of conduct and legal compliance 
• approving and monitoring the 
progress of major capital expenditure, 
capital management and acquisitions 
and divestitures 
• Reviewing  management's  plans 
for business resiliency 
• Overseeing  the  company, 
including its control and accountability 
systems. 
Boards of directors operate using 
committees to assist them. Effective 
corporate governance requires audit, 
corporate governance (nominating) and 
compensation committees. 
 
Audit committee 
Every publicly owned corporation 
should have an audit committee 
comprised solely of independent 
directors. Audit committees typically 
consist of 3 to 5 members. Audit 
committee members should assure 
compliance with financial standards. At 
least one of the committee members 
should have accounting or financial 
management expertise, as required by 
the listing standards of the major 
securities markets. 
The functions of the audit 
committee are: 
•  Makes corporation's risk 
assessment and audits management 
practices 
• Supervise  the  corporation's 
relationship with its outside auditor, 
• Assess the performance and 
independence of the external auditors 
•  Review and discuss with 
management and the outside auditor 
the corporation's critical accounting 
policies and the quality of accounting 
judgments and estimates made by 
management 
•  Review the corporation's 
procedures addressing compliance with 
the law 
• Review with outside auditors 
the adequacy of internal controls 
system 
•  Assess the management 
processes supporting external reporting 
• Assure  communication  between 
board for the outside auditor and 
internal auditors 
 
Corporate governance 
committee 
The corporate governance 
committee's role is to recommend 
director nominees to the full board and 
the corporation's stockholders. Others 
functions of corporate governance 
committee are: 
•  Monitor and keep 
independence of the board 
•  Makes evaluation of the board 
and management 
•  Supervises process of providing 
information to the full board  
•  Develops and recommend a set 
of corporate governance principles and 
best practices applicable to the 
corporation. 
 
Compensation committee 
Compensation committee 
oversees the corporation's overall 
compensation programs, and setting 
CEO and senior management 
compensation.  The structure of 
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directly link the interests of 
management, both individually and as a 
team, to the long-term interests of 
stockholders. 
 
CEO (Chief Executive Officer) 
CEO manages the corporation in 
an effective and ethical manner. The 
most important undertakings of a CEO 
are: 
• Run the corporation's day-to-
day business operations; 
• Take the lead in strategic 
planning; 
• Develops  annual  operating 
plans and annual budgets for the 
corporation; 
•  Establishing a quality staff and 
a an effective organizational structure; 
•  Identifies and manages risks; 
•  Is responsible for the integrity of 
the corporation's financial reporting 
system. 
 
Principles of corporate 
governance in emerging 
countries 
Corporate governance is only part 
of the larger economic context in which 
firms operate, which includes, for 
example, macroeconomic policies and 
the degree of competition in product 
and factor markets. The corporate 
governance framework also depends on 
the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment. In addition, factors such 
as business ethics and corporate 
awareness of the environmental and 
societal interests of the communities in 
which it operates can also have an 
impact on the reputation and the long 
term success of a company. 
Although instituting corporate 
governance is clearly beneficial for firms 
and countries, the rapid pace of 
globalization has made the need urgent. 
Doing so requires that firms and 
national governments make some 
fundamental changes. Companies must 
change the way they operate, while 
national governments must establish 
and maintain the appropriate 
institutional framework. 
Efforts to improve corporate 
governance by establishing international 
standards began roughly 15 years ago 
and have recently gained enormous 
momentum. 
The principles are primarily 
intended to provide assistance to 
governments in creating a corporate 
governance framework. They can 
indeed be a useful point of reference for 
many emerging markets and economies 
in transition. Not only do the principles 
provide a benchmark for internationally 
accepted standards, they also offer a 
solid platform for analysis and practices 
in individual countries taking into 
account country specific circumstances, 
such as legal and cultural traditions. 
Corporate governance is receiving 
substantial attention in developed 
countries. Think tanks and business 
associations throughout the developing 
world and in the transitional economies 
are also focusing resources on 
corporate governance. 
In order for corporate governance 
measures to have a meaningful impact 
in any economy, a set of core 
democratic, market institutions, 
including a legal system to enforce 
contracts and property rights, needs to 
be up and running. Yet, in most 
developing economies, even the most 
basic democratic, market institutions 
may be weak. Given these 
circumstances, instituting corporate 
governance in developing and emerging 
markets requires more than merely 
exporting well-established models of 
corporate governance that function 
within the developed economies. 
Special attention needs to be given to 
establishing the necessary political and 
economic institutions that are tailored to 
a country’s specific needs and that give 
corporate governance effectiveness. 
In Table 1 are presented the main 
countries which develop full texts of 
corporate governance codes, principles 
of corporate governance and corporate 
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countries and developing countries. 
CGRI (corporate governance regulation 
index) is the product between years of 
development and number of acts. 
Table 1 
Corporate governance regulation index 
Countries  Development 
period 
Number of 
acts  CGRI 
Developed countries      
Australia 1995-2008  9  117 
Austria 2002-2008  4  24 
Canada 1994-2008  7  98 
Denmark 2000-2008  4  32 
Finland 2003-2008  2  10 
France 1995-2008  6  78 
Germany 1998-2008  11  110 
Iceland 2004-2008  2  8 
Ireland 1999-2008  1  9 
Italy 1998-2008  5  50 
Japan 1997-2008  5  55 
New Zealand  2003-2008  5  25 
Norway 2004-2008  4  16 
Portugal 1999-2008  6  54 
Sweden 2001-2008  5  35 
Switzerland 2002-2008  3  18 
Netherlands 1997-2008  6  66 
United Kingdom  1992-2008  21  357 
USA 1997-2008  12  132 
Emerging countries      
Bangladesh 2004-2008  1  4 
Brasil 1999-2008  3  27 
Bulgaria 2008  1  1 
China 2001-2008  2  14 
Cyprus 2002-2008  3  18 
Czech Republic  2001-2008  2  14 
Estonia 2006-2008  1  2 
Greece 1999-2008  2  18 
Hungary 2002-2008  2  12 
India   1998-2008  3  30 
Indonesia 2000-2008  3  24 
Jamaica 2005-2008  3  9 
Latvia 2005-2008  1  3 
Lithuania 2003-2008  1  5 
Mexico 1999-2008  1  9 
Peru 2001-2008  2  14 
Poland 2002-2008  4  24 
Romania 2000-2008  2  16 
Russia 2002-2008  1  6 
Turkey 2003-2008  1  5 
Ukraine 2003-2008  1  5 
Source: European Corporate Governance Institute, “Index of all codes”, http://www.ecgi.org 
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of establishing a democratic, market-
based framework and a corporate 
governance system. Hence, each nation 
has its own particular set of challenges. 
Some of the general challenges 
confronting developing, emerging and 
transitional economies include (CIPE, 
2002): 
•  Establishing a rule-based 
(as opposed to a relationship-based) 
system of governance; 
•  Combating vested interests; 
•  Severing links such as cross 
shareholdings between banks and 
corporations; 
• Establishing property rights 
systems that clearly and easily 
identify true owners even if the 
• De-politicizing  decision-
making and establishing firewalls 
between the government and 
• Protecting  and  enforcing 
minority shareholders` rights; 
• Preventing asset stripping 
after mass privatization; 
• Finding active owners and 
skilled managers amid diffuse 
ownership structures; 
•  Cultivating technical and 
professional know-how. 
There appear to have been 
improvements in establishing principles 
and codes that regularize corporate 
governance in a few emerging countries 
(Poland, Brasil, India etc). Most of the 
emerging countries are at the beginning 
of the developing corporate governance 
framework process. 
 
Corporate governance 
principles and practice in 
Romania 
The evaluation of corporate 
governance for Romania  (the analysis 
of the existent framework of corporate 
governance through corporate 
governance principles) and other 
analysis highlighted a series of 
recommendations: 
 
The legal framework  
The accent is put on the 
application of existent laws. It is 
essential that discard exceptions from 
privatization programs and privatized 
companies. The transactions operated 
by insiders must be published. Other 
recommendations are: 
• The clarification of managers’ 
tasks, functions, responsibilities and 
obligations; 
•  The authorization of the 
employment of an outside auditor by the 
stakeholders through Commercial 
Societies’ Law; 
•  The establishment of a 
minimum number for board of directors 
(administration council); 
•  The extension of corporation's 
board authority in order to include the 
analysis of financial statements; 
• The change of censors’ role 
(censors – independent members of 
corporation's board taking the form of 
audit committee); 
•  The clear demand for board of 
directors members to act with the 
needed attention and diligence and in 
the companies’ interests; 
•  The disassociation of the 
general manager function from that of 
corporation's board President; 
•  The requirement that sales and 
assets’ transfer should be realized  at 
market prices also in the case of 
affiliated or connected parties; 
•  Stakeholders’ meeting will 
appoint external auditors for the 
company; 
•  The enlargement of property’s 
definition in order to include the 
relations of indirect control (in the Law 
of stocks and shares); 
•  The requirement of the 
announcement of direct or indirect 
control relations. 
 
The institutional framework  
CNVM (Stocks and Shares 
National Commission) should focus on 
following information’s transparency and 
the implementation of international 
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companies. It is crucial to apply the 
CNVM jurisdiction for all the listed 
companies, including those from 
RASDAQ (secondary financial market) 
and clarify status for the latter (that 
implies obligations of transparency and 
protection of stakeholders’ rights).  
 
Voluntary/private initiatives  
One of important action is the 
updating of Corporate Governance 
Code, with a focus on some problems 
regarding the functioning of the 
corporation's board, in correlation with 
changes of Commercial Societies’ Law. 
The Code has to include 
recommendations of good practices 
regarding the independence, the 
functionality and the work procedures of 
corporation's board. The Code has to 
be voluntary, being followed by the 
companies, as a condition for their 
listing to the stock exchange; an 
Institute of Administrators (through 
Bucharest Stock Exchange) should offer 
training (for managers, administrators 
and judges), accreditation, disseminate 
good practices and participate at the 
dialogue between the public and the 
private sectors. 
Also Bucharest Stock Exchange 
initiated a Corporate Governance 
Institute (2003) that sets itself to 
develop information and formation 
activities regarding corporate 
governance standards. The official 
launch of “BSE Corporate Governance 
Institute” took place in June 2005. 
Previously, BSE established the PLUS 
Tier at the Stock Exchange at which 
companies that had adopted Corporate 
Governance Code of BSE (included in 
BSE Regulation no. 3) are listed. 
This procedure will be changed 
with the proposal of voluntary 
adherence to the set of principles 
regarding corporate governance with 
total or partial acceptance. Even in 
these new conditions the 
implementation of corporate 
governance standards by the Romanian 
companies won’t be total and immediate 
but gradual. 
 
Conclusions 
The crusade to institute rigorous 
corporate governance is not over once 
these key political and economic 
institutions are in place. Well-designed, 
well-functioning institutions can only 
enforce existing corporate governance 
guidelines and codes. If these 
guidelines or codes fail to address key 
corporate governance issues, even the 
best institutions will be unable to offer 
solutions. A crucial weakness of existing 
guidelines is that the rules do not apply 
to all corporations equally. The 
guidelines, for example, do not apply to 
unlisted corporations many of which are 
family-owned. Yet family-owned 
companies dominate many developing 
country economies and figure 
prominently in certain developed 
economies as well. 
In order to be effective, existing 
guidelines need to be supplemented to 
address these types of corporate 
governance issues as well. 
In Romania a working group 
reviewed global best practices, 
assessed Romanian corporate 
governance legislation and practices, 
and then developed a corporate 
governance strategy for Romania 
entitled, Blueprint for Action. Parts of 
the code were adopted by the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange. Afterwards 
Bucharest Stock Exchange has created 
a Corporate Governance Institute for 
development of own corporate 
governance code. 
The most important conclusion of 
this paper is that the extent of legal 
reform in these areas of the law has 
been impressive. In fact, many of the 
emerging countries can today boast 
higher levels of investor rights 
protection than some of the most 
developed market economies. Yet, the 
development of the law has not been 
matched so far by the development of 
financial markets. Improving the law in 
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solution, but will not be rewarded unless 
a commitment to rule-based 
governance of markets is made 
credible. 
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